US Dept. of State ITAR / DDTC Registered Manufacturer / DUNS 96-648-0345 / CAGE 3BNS6
NYCPASS Port SUP1646628 / NYS Vender ID # 1000034176 / NJS Vender ID # 13262250
NYS Explosives Mfgr - Dealer / §478.99(d) Armor Piercing Ammunition / AA&E Level 2 / GML 103
FAR, FAR2 and SOP 00 11 -Compliant / WAWF - Compliant / IPP - BAA - TAA Compliant,
Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) Certified / SP 800-171
Defense Contractor since 1994
Federal Security Contractors
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| Nuclear Power Facilities -
Atomic Laboratories Until the US Attorney General approves
of the Dept. of Energy's procedures to equip "Facility
Physical Security Contractors" as per 42 U.S.C 2201a (which
should happen shortly), all procurement and possession of
weapons (pistols, rifles, shotguns, machine guns, flash-bang
grenades, etc.) must be made via the actual licensing
federal government agency. Security contractors are not
allowed to purchase, take transfer and/or possess weapons
(including NFA weapons) regardless of who they are or where
they operate. Contractors who desire to be so equipped must
contact their facility's Federal Contracting Officer (FCO)
and arrange for the Purchase Order to be issued by the
Government agency under which the Contractor is licensed by.
Under current contract status, payments can be made by the
contractor but ownership must remain with the government
agency. Please contact us for documentation requirements and
additional ordering procedures. Special Note to government Security Operations within NYS |
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Animal Disease Laboratories Same procedures as above agencies.Security contractors are not allowed to purchase, take transfer and/or possess weapons (including NFA weapons) regardless of who or where they operate. Contractors may only OPERATE the weapons owned and titled by the licensing governmental entity. Please contact us for documentation requirements and additional ordering procedures. |
Defense Facilities & Research Centers Same procedures as above agencies. Please contact us for documentation requirements and additional ordering procedures. |
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US Department of State Security Contracting Companies Same procedures as above agencies. Contractors who desire to be so equipped must contact their facility's Federal Contracting Officer (FCO) and arrange for the Purchase Order to be issued by the Government agency under which the Contractor is licensed by. Under current contract status, payments can be made by the contractor but ownership must remain with the government agency. Please contact us for documentation requirements and additional ordering procedures. |
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Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) Guidance for Iraq and Afghanistan Cases (Revised 11/01/06) Application Submission All Iraq and Afghanistan cases should be clearly marked as such so that they may be rapidly processed. For D-Trade and EllieNet cases, the Transaction ID should begin with the letters “OIF” or “OEF” (OIF – Operation Iraqi Freedom – for Iraq, OEF – Operation Enduring Freedom – for Afghanistan). These cases will automatically be routed to the appropriate licensing division/licensing officer. In order to efficiently process these urgent applications, we request that every effort be made to submit them on D-Trade. Hard copy submissions should note OIF or OEF in the purpose block (Block 20 for the DSP-05; Block 21 for the DSP-73 and DSP-61). These should include a bright color cover sheet indicating that the case is for OIF or OEF. Direct the case to the appropriate licensing officer based on the U.S. Munitions List (USML) category of the defense article/service and/or technical data that is proposed for export.
The DOD (DTSA) coordinator for OEF/OIF submissions is Kevin Maloney (703) 325-4009. The alternate is Natalie Everest (703) 325-3971. Supporting Documentation - Include a complete copy of the contract or purchase order applicable to the proposed export. Include a reference to the contract number assigned by the U.S. Army Project and Contracting Office (PCO) (if applicable). The contract or purchase order should confirm the details of the submission, e.g. commodity, quantity, and end user. For exports to coalition partners, a letter should be included from the partner government confirming the transaction and that it is in support of OIF or OEF. Include a copy of product specifications/descriptive literature that clearly details the commodities requested for export. Under current circumstances, it is the policy of the U.S. Government (USG) to require end-use and retransfer assurances for all exports of defense articles to Iraq. For the time being, the applicant need not supply a DSP-83 for cases where the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) is the proposed end-user. To legally satisfy the requirements of the Arms Export Control Act and International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), the IIG has supplied the USG with blanket end-use assurances, which will be used for the near future, without an accompanying DSP-83, for approved exports to the IIG. The application must have a cover letter that explains that the DSP-83 has not been submitted based on this understanding. For D-Trade submissions, this explanation should be included as a PDF file in lieu of the DSP-83. The USG will officially notify the IIG of all exports to Iraq approved on the basis of such assurances. No further action by the applicant is required. DSP-83s are required for Significant Military Equipment (SME) exports to the Interim Government of Afghanistan. For coalition forces serving with Operation Iraqi Freedom, a DSP-83 is generally required only for exports of SME. (As with exports to any other destination, DDTC may require a DSP-83 for the export of any defense article or service, at its discretion.) - For exports to other non-IIG end-users in Iraq (“private” end-users, e.g., international organizations and private contractors), signatures are required on a DSP-83 from the foreign consignee and from the end-user. For the near future, the requirement for the IIG signature on Block 8 of form DSP-83 will be satisfied by the IIG’s blanket assurances. The transmittal letter should also clearly state this. DDTC has a longstanding policy of not authorizing fully-automatic weapons to private entities, but has made an exception with regard to the activities of private security companies in Iraq/Afghanistan. The preference is for these weapons to be exported temporarily on DSP-73s, although DSP-5s will be considered with appropriate justification. For fully-automatic firearms proposed for export to a non-IIG (private) end-user in Iraq, DDTC requires:
U.S. companies should pay keen attention to the brokering requirements under Part 129 of the ITAR, and they may not begin such activities until they have the appropriate approvals on registration and licensing in place. Also, all sources should be completely described, including names, locations and addresses.
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Special Note for government Security Contractor Operations for the NRC/DoE within NYS - As of now, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) guidelines have not yet been finalized. Accordingly, contractors at NRC licensed facilities are not yet eligible to possess machineguns and ATF could not approve the transfer of machineguns to such contractor. The federal agency can purchase and issue the firearms to the contractor but the firearms remain United States Government property. You should also note that New York State law generally prohibits the possession of machineguns and BATFE is not aware of an exception that would allow a security contractor to possess. ATF cannot approve an application for transfer where the receipt and possession of the firearm would place the transferee in violation of State law. If and when the NRC guidelines are finalized, BATFE would need confirmation by State authorities that possession under the described circumstances is lawful. |
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 September 13, 2009http://www.lohud.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=2009909130338 Nuke plant guards may get machine guns Greg Clary BUCHANAN - Federal regulators are taking steps to allow nuclear plant security guards to carry machine guns and sawed-off shotguns, a step that even some industry opponents support as a way to match the firepower of potential terrorists. "It's my belief that an upgrade of this kind is long overdue," said Edwin Lyman, a global security expert with the Union of Concerned Scientists in Washington, D.C. "There's not a ban on semi-automatic weapons anymore, so that's what's out there, not just for terrorists but for the guy on the street," he said. "Security officers need more firepower." Indian Point officials have not decided if they will add "enhanced weapons," which the Nuclear Regulatory Commission calls the machine guns, short-barreled shotguns or short-barreled rifles, but will review their alternatives when the regulations are finalized. "With any change in regulations that provide additional options or opportunities, we would look at potential enhancements in our security posture," said Dan Gagnon, security manager at Indian Point. "However, specialized weapons and their potential impact is just one element of a comprehensive security program." The NRC acknowledges that there hasn't been a single shot fired to defend a nuclear power plant, but the changes were included in the Energy Policy Act of 2005, and the new guidelines have been approved by the U.S. Attorney General, agency officials said. The final regulations could take until 2011 to hammer out. NRC spokesman Neil Sheehan said the timing of the announcement on the eighth anniversary of Sept. 11 was coincidental. Lyman said the anniversary of the terrorist attacks was a good time to remember the importance of not underestimating America's enemies. While the Nuclear Energy Institute, an industry association, supports the weapon upgrades, there are those who think there's more to fear than heavily armed attackers. "These weapons won't protect us from the spontaneous problems related to the aging of the plant itself, such as steam boiler ruptures, transformer explosions, clogged cooling water intakes or whatever is discovered next," said Manna Jo Greene, environmental director for Hudson River Sloop Clearwater. "Anything that lessens that danger is welcome, but this additional protection does not address the larger issues." Thomas Locke, a retired FBI agent and private security official in Washington, D.C., said the key to properly handling increased firepower is the person with the gun in his or her hands and the training they have received. "The bad guys are bringing automatic weapons and explosives, so you have to have something to fight back with," said Locke, who trained nuclear plant guards during an FBI tenure in Tennessee. "The key is vetting the personnel who are going to be assigned these tasks and then training, training and training." Nuclear material cannot be allowed to leave the site, Locke said. "We talk about casualties all the time, and the emphasis is always on the safety and security of law enforcement personnel," he said. "But there's no room for error with this type of stuff." Locke said highly trained officers know not to just spray bullets with machine guns; that shorter, more focused bursts of ammunition will be more effective. With inadequate firepower, however, even sharpshooters can find themselves in trouble. "We learned a hard lesson back in 1986 in Miami, when two bank robbers with automatic weapons took on FBI agents armed with revolvers and rifles," he said. "We got the robbers, but we lost two agents, and eight others were wounded. You have to have the weapons and you have to know how to use them." |
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§ 123.17
Exports of firearms, ammunition, and body armor. * * * * *
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